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LAW REVIEW NUMBER 4
A NEW TRUST CODE FOR LOUISIANA: SOME
BASIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS*
Leonard Oppenheim* *
I. INTRODUCTIONP resently in force in Louisiana is a comprehensive Trust
Estates Law, enacted in 1938, following repeal in 1935 of the
Trust Act of 1920. The 1938 act was inadequate in a number
of respects. One shortcoming- the limited duration of the pri-
vate trust necessitated by a provision of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1921 -was eliminated, at least partially, by constitu-
tional and legislative amendments of 1952. In 1959, when the
Louisiana State Law Institute launched the present project for
a new trust code, the Trust Estates Law was still defective in
that it foreclosed to Louisiana residents many federal tax ad-
vantages made available to residents of other states by the trust
device; failed to crystallize for Louisiana attorneys the alien
concept of coexistent legal and equitable title to property; and
was not adequately integrated with the provisions of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code dealing with forced heirship, prohibited sub-
stitutions and fidei commissa. These shortcomings have limited
the flexibility of the trust device in Louisiana for those attor-
neys who do use it, and discouraged others from even trying.1
The first step in the present Louisiana State Law Institute
project required a decision as to the basic approach to the task
in hand. On the basis of careful study it was decided to retain
the trust concept embodied in the 1938 act, but to strive for
clarity and certainty in operation by defining precisely the uses
of the word "trust" within a civil law framework; and to seek
*This article is an expanded and updated version of the report given by the
writer on the progress of the trusts revision project at the annual meeting of the
Louisiana State Law Institute in New Orleans, Louisiana, in March 1963.
**Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. For fuller discussion of the defects of the Louisiana law of private trusts,
see Oppenheim, Why a Revision of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act Is Necessary,
18 LA. L. REV. 599 (1958).
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the maximum flexibility, consistent with fundamental principles
of Louisiana's legal system, for achievement of family and tax
advantages. Certain intermediate legislation was proposed by
the Institute and enacted in 1962, both to eliminate uncertainties
in the present law created by two Louisiana court decisions and
to open the way for the contemplated new trust code. 2
It seems to this writer that it is no longer necessary to con-
tinue the argument raised in some quarters that the trust should
not be introduced into Louisiana. In the first place, Louisiana
has had trusts since 1920 and, in the second place, even if Lou-
isiana had no trust concept, Louisiana residents could still set
up trusts in other states. Moreover, there is no reason why
Louisiana residents should be denied the family and tax ad-
vantages enjoyed by residents elsewhere. As pointed out above,
this does not mean that Louisiana should adopt the common law
trust in its entirety but rather that the trust device in Louisiana
should accord when practicable and desirable with our civil law
concepts. To adopt an extremely limited trust which would not
serve the purposes sought to be achieved would also be futile.
With these limitations and ideas in mind, the work on a new
trust code has proceeded.
II. FUNDAMENTAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Title and Duration Period
The first fundamental problem which concerned the Reporter
was: Should the trustee have title? The Reporter and the Ad-
visory Committee unanimously adopted a resolution to the effect
that in Louisiana we retain the traditional Anglo-American trust
concept contained in the present Trust Estates Law, but define
with precision the uses of the word "trust" within a civil law
framework so far as is practicable and desirable. This decision
was overwhelmingly supported by the Council at its meeting on
February 19, 1960.
Most of the civilian jurisdictions regarded the dual owner-
ship of trust property as the fundamental characteristic of the
trust and, in order to avoid split ownership, sought to use the
trust device without recognizing the trustee as owner of the
2. The 1962 trust amendments are dealt with at length in Oppenheim, A New
Trust Code for Louisiana: Some Steps Toward Its Achievement, 37 TUL. L. REV.
169 (1963). The two decisions referred to are Succession of Guillory, 232 La.
213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957) ; In re Succession of Meadors, 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, Feb. 6, 1962.
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property. At least two of these, Mexico and Quebec, have swung
to the title theory.3 The Union of South Africa, with its Roman-
Dutch background, has always insisted that the trustee has title
to the property, but that there is no dual ownership of the prop-
erty itself.4 Some leading English and American scholars have
held this view of the nature of the Anglo-American trust, that
is, that there is no split ownership of the trust property.5 If
split ownership be the objection to giving the trustee title, it
can be shown that the dual ownership of the trust property is
not a necessary feature of the trust.
It was necessary, of course, to consider the effect of the
internal revenue rulings upon any new trust institution in which
the trustee would not be given title to the property. After care-
ful consideration it was felt that unforeseen tax problems and
confusion might well arise if Louisiana departs from the present
Trust Estates Act, particularly as the view of the Reporter and
the Advisory Committee indicates that this concept of owner-
ship in the trustee is the correct one.
The second major problem which was considered was: Should
the maximum duration period of the trust be revised? As a
matter of fact, the Reporter and the Advisory Committee believe
that the maximum duration period of the trust is one of the
most important problems to be considered. The 1952 amend-
ment did extend the duration period, but a great deal of con-
fusion was caused by the wording of the amendment. The best
example of this is to be found in the word "beneficiary" as
included in the amendment. Since beneficiary was not defined,
it was not known whether the income or principal beneficiary
was meant. The alternate ten-year period also caused consider-
able confusion since it was not known exactly what happened
when the income beneficiary died within the ten-year period.
A survey was made of the other states to determine if they
have any limitations specifically applicable to the duration of
a private trust. Only Oklahoma had such a statute, which stated
that trusts were to be "limited in duration to a definite period
of not to exceed twenty-one years or to the period of the life or
3. 12 BAUDOUIN, LE DBROr CIVIL DE LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC ch. 6 (1953) ;
Goldschmidt, The Trust in the Countries of Latin America, 3 INTEs-AMERICAN
L. REV. 29 (1961).
4. Hablo, The Trust in South African Law, 2 INTER-AMEwICAN L. REV. 229
(1960).
5. 4 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 500 (1954) ; Williams, The Three
Uncertainties, 4 MODERN L. REv. 20 (1940).
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lives of the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof." This statute
was amended in 1949 so as to be inapplicable to private trusts.
The common law rule against perpetuities ordinarily requires
only that all interests become vested not later than the expira-
tion of the period of the rule.7 However, there is a growing
tendency to use the same period as a limitation upon the duration
of an indestructible trust even when all the interests are vested.
New York particularly has applied its perpetuity rule to the
duration of trust because by statute every trust to pay income
is indestructible.8 The present statute adopts the indestructi-
bility rule obtained by judicial decision in the American states,
contrary to the English rule which allows the beneficiary to
terminate the trust if he is under no disability. Nevertheless,
the proposed duration period for Louisiana is more conservative
than the rule in any other state, whether statutory or judicial,
and is also more conservative than the Restatement of Property
rule.
The Committee specifically rejected any time limit based
upon the period of the common law rule against perpetuities,
and also narrowed the present rule from any beneficiary to an
income beneficiary.9 The Committee contemplates the possibility
that an income beneficiary might die soon after the creation of
the trust and the trust purposes would be defeated by the termi-
nation of the trust. An alternate minimum period is therefore
proposed. The settlor can provide that the trust be continued
for fifteen years in all events, but he must expressly elect this
alternate period. The life of the income beneficiary is the
measuring life; the life of the principal beneficiary cannot be
the measuring life unless he is also an income beneficiary under
the terms of the trust instrument. If he receives income under
the terms of the trust instrument, he is an income beneficiary,
however, whether or not he is specifically designated an income
beneficiary. It was foreseen that a principal beneficiary who
is not to receive income under the terms of the trust instrument
might become an income beneficiary by reason of the operation
6. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 172 (1963) ; see Browder, Perpetuities in Okla-
homa, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1953).
7. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1222-35 (1956).
8. N.Y. PERs. PROP. § 15; see 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING ch. XI, pp. 62741
(3d ed. 1961).
9. Some of these results were achieved by amending the duration section of
the Trust Estates Law by La. Acts 1962, No. 74. See Oppenheim, A New Trust
Code for Louisiana: Some Steps Toward Its Achievement, 37 TUL. L. REv. 169,
178-80 (1963).
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of the minimium fifteen-year period. It is made clear, therefore,
that under such circumstances the principal beneficiary is not
an income beneficiary for the purpose of determining the maxi-
mum term of the trust.
B. Successive Beneficiaries
(1) Separate Income and Principal Beneficiaries. - The
proposed draft of the duration period contemplates that the in-
come beneficiary. and principal beneficiary may be different
persons. There is no substitution of beneficial interest here
because there is no identity of the "thing" or interest. One takes
income, the other takes principal. In substitution, the first
donee must take the property, the title, which is divested only
if the substitute survives the institute. In the case of income
beneficiary, that person can never take the entire ownership. His
interest is never the inheritable property, even if the second
donee should die first. Civil Code Article 607 states that a dona-
tion of the revenues of property is "a kind of usufruct" for the
purpose of determining its duration. However, this interest may
not be strict usufruct.10
It seems obvious, then, that a donation of income to one and
principal to another should not constitute substitution. More-
over, the 1962 trust amendments have now set at rest the im-
plications of Guillory and Meadors."1
(2) Successive Income Beneficiaries. - Successive income
beneficiaries are permissible without conflicting with any Civil
Code provision. Furthermore, the surviving income beneficiaries
can take the shares of those predeceasing, until the last sur-
viving income beneficiary takes all the income. The analogy to
usufruct is used, just as Civil Code Article 607 analogizes an
income interest to usufruct. There is language in Succession of
McCan12 that the only dismemberment of ownership which can
be made is by separating the usufruct "for a single life." This
language cannot be taken literally since Civil Code Article 538
allows the usufruct to be given to more than one. The language
of McCan cannot preclude the interpretation of one lifetime to
10. Orphan Society v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 62 (1857). See also Suc-
cession of Auld, 44 La. Ann. 591, 594, 10 So. 877, 877 (1892) : "It is equally
true that the reprobated disposition must be of property of the testator, and not
of income or revenue to subsequently accrue from the use of property after the
testator's death."
11. See Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for Louisiana: Some Steps Toward Its
Achievement, 37 TUL. L. REv. 169, 175-76 (1963).
12. 48 La. Ann. 145, 166 (1896).
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mean the surviving one. There is no substitution because the
right of each usufructuary dies with him; it is not "preserved
and returned." The Roman law allowed successive usufructs,
provided that all donees were in being.13 All the French writers
agree that they are permitted, and the Louisiana jurisprudence
has allowed it. 14
In case the usufruct is donated to several persons con-
jointly, rather than one after the other, the question arises
whether or not the survivors may take the fractional share of
fruits. The answer is in the Civil Code itself. Article 539 states
that usufruct may be given in divided or undivided portions.
This article seems to contemplate the distinction made in Roman
law that usufruct might be conjoint or in separate shares. Since
the Roman law considered that the fruits were earned from day
to day, the usufruct was never "vested" in the sense that accre-
tion could no longer take place. Because it was conditioned on
the survival of the usufructuary, the usufruct could remain con-
joint. The right of accretion was not cut off.' 5 This same view
is given by Frere-Smith in Manual of South African Trust
Law.16 He states that by traditional civil law usufruct may be
conjoint and the survivors take the entire income. 7 All the
French writers have agreed that usufruct in several persons
may be "revertible" to the survivors. Finally, the Louisiana
jurisprudence has recognized conjoint usufruct.'
Our research convinces us that the new trust act may au-
thorize survivorship rights in income, and this would not be
substitution.'9 The duration provision approved by the Council
contemplates this in speaking of the duration for the life of the
last surviving income beneficiary.
C. Accumulation of Income and Invasion of Principal
The Reporter and the Advisory Committee unanimously rec-
13. BUCKLAND & McNAIB, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 127-32 (2d ed.
1952).
14. McCalop v. Stewart, 11 La. Ann. 106 (1856) ; see Gibson v. Zylks, 186
La. 1043, 173 So. 757 (1937).
15. DIGEST 7.2.1.
16. FRERE-SMITH, MANUAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRUST LAW 42-47 (1953).
17. Id. at 44.
18. Samuels v. Brownlee, 36 La. Ann. 228 (1884) ; Arcenaux v. Bernard,
10 La. 246 (1836).
19. For a further analysis of this point, see Oppenheim, A New Trust Code
for Loui8iana: Some Step8 Toward Its Achievement, 37 TUL. L. REV. 169, 176
(1963).
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ommend that these provisions be permitted expressly by the
new trust act, for the reason that we do not believe that any
substitution takes place, nor is there a power of appointment
created.
If there is a sole beneficiary of the trust or of a separate
share of the trust, there can be no substitution in accumulating
his income or invading his principal for his benefit. The same
person is entitled to income and principal so there can be no
shifting of economic benefit.
If the income beneficiary and principal beneficiary are dif-
ferent persons, although it is believed that even here there is
no substitution or power of appointment, a tentative decision
was made not to permit invasion in this situation. Recent com-
ments have made the Committee agree to reconsider this deci-
sion.2 o
(1) Accumulation of Income.- The Civil Code states that
the donation of the revenues of a property is "a kind of usu-
fruct.' ' 21 The jurisprudence has noted that this is a peculiar
type of usufruct, unaccompanied by any right to possession. 22
The Civil Code does, however, recognize an interest in the fruits
which may not be necessarily strict usufruct, but which is like
usufruct for the purpose of duration of the interest.23 This in-
terest, then, cannot be a forbidden "tenure" of property. It is
analogous to usufruct; it is more like an annuity or an alimen-
tary pension. So long as the first donee receives only income,
and the principal is given to another, there can be no question
of substitution. If all the revenues of a property can be given
to one, surely less than all the revenues may be donated. The
Code contemplates this in charging the usufructuary with the
payment of annuities. The annuitant receives less than all the
income. 24 In Succession of Cotton,25 the court characterized as
20. The Reporter and two members of the Advisory Committee (Mr. Alvin
Rubin of Baton Rouge and Mr. Cecil Ramey of Shreveport) participated in a
panel discussion entitled "Stump the Trust Experts" before the Trust Estates,
Probate and Immovable Property Law Section at the Annual Meeting of the
Louisiana State Bar Association at Biloxi, Mississippi, on April 25, 1963. During
the discussion it became apparent that many attorneys believe that there should
be invasion of principal even though the income and principal beneficiaries are
different. persons.
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 607 (1870).
22. Orphan Society v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 62 (1857).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 607 (1870).
24. Id. art. 580.
25. 172 La. 819, 135 So. 368 (1931).
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an annuity a provision for a specified amount of the income for
the income beneficiary. By provision of the Civil Code, the fruits
follow the property,26 so it seems that under the Civil Code itself
a portion of the fruits can be donated, and the remainder would
be "accumulated" and added to the principal.
There is no power of appointment in the trustee for the
reason that the standard for determining what the income bene-
ficiary will actually receive is provided in the trust itself. If
the trust instrument grants an income interest to the beneficiary,
limited by an ascertainable standard of support, the trustee must
follow the standard. In doing so he is exercising a fiduciary
power; he is not shifting the economic benefit. This distinction
is used in tax law and it seems to be a valid distinction for our
use in determining whether there is a power of appointment
forbidden by Civil Code Article 1573.
Our civil law system has always understood the alimentary
pension. While ordinarily the amount is set in specific terms,
there is no Civil Code rule requiring this so long as the donor
makes the amount ascertainable so as to avoid power of appoint-
ment. In this case the standard prevents the trustee from ap-
pointing the beneficial interest in the sense of Civil Code Article
1573. There seems to be no reason why accumulation should not
be permitted.
(2) Invasion of Principal. - Accumulation of income can
never be substitution because there is no shifting of principal.
The invasion of principal is more difficult because the income
beneficiary receives principal that is first vested in the principal
beneficiary. However, our law has always understood that sub-
stitution takes place at the death of the donee who is first
"vested" with the ownership. In this case the income beneficiary
may receive principal, but he does not receive it at the death of
the vested owner. Here the transfer may occur at any time.
The power of invasion has no relation to the death of the vested
owner, so there can be no substitution. The principal beneficiary
does not preserve the principal for his lifetime, and then return
it to another.
The income beneficiary has an interest in the nature of
annuity or alimentary pension. Ordinarily an annuity or ali-
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 499 (1.870).
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mentary pension is charged first on the legatee of the usufruct.27
If, however, there is no legacy of usufruct, the legatee or heir of
the succession must pay the charge, even if it is necessary to use
some of the capital of the succession. The universal legatee has
merely been given less.
The case of In re Courtin28 is authority for allowing in-
vasion of principal for support. The case has been criticized29
on the basis that the court treated the interest as "quasi-
usufruct." The best explanation of the case is that the universal
legatee was charged with an annuity, first to be paid from in-
come but to be paid from principal if necessary. The case is
consistent in result with the Civil Code provisions that contem-
plate an annuity or alimentary pension for support, charged on
the heir or universal legatee.
There is no power of appointment for the same reason as
detailed above. The standard of support set by the settlor means
that he has given the principal beneficiary less than the full
amount of the principal. The settlor, not the trustee, has deter-
mined the quantity of interest. It should be noted that any
legacy of usufruct, annuity, or alimentary pension is uncertain
in total dollar amount, for that total will depend upon the length
of the annuitant's life. The amount to be received need not be
ascertained in dollars so long as it is ascertainable from the
terms of the donation. It may well be that invasion of principal
should be permitted in all situations. 0
(3) Sprinkling or Spray Provisions. - The Reporter and
the Committee do not recommend that "sprinkling" trusts or
"spray" provisions be authorized. Where these give absolute
discretion to the trustee and thus may constitute a power of
appointment, such provisions would be highly inadvisable.
D. The Right To Terminate the Trust
This question was raised again in connection with the dura-
tion period, after a study of the substitution problem had been
made.
27. Id. art. 580.
28. 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457 (1919).
29. Nabors, Restrictions Upon the Ownership of Property in Louisiana -
Trusts, "Fidei Commissa" and Substitutions, 4 TuL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1929).
30. Of course, the legitime of the forced heir could not be impinged upon by
an invasion provision.
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In a trust for a sole beneficiary, or a separate share for a
sole beneficiary, the beneficiary "owns" the principal, yet he
cannot receive the property free of the charge of trust at any
time during his lifetime. He has been given income and prin-
cipal; as a practical matter he has income plus the power to
dispose of the principal at his death to anyone he may choose.
Aside from the invalidity of the power of appointment, the
French authorities see a substitution if the power is limited to
one of a particular class. 31 If, however, the power is unlimited
and the donee may choose anyone he wishes, there has been no
second gratuity and there is no substitution. However, the
charge to preserve is reputed not written.3 2 Obviously the
charge of trust cannot be reputed not written. It is then argu-
able that the beneficiary is required to preserve his spendthrift
interest in principal for his entire lifetime and return it at his
death to another. Any allegation of substitution could be cured
by giving the beneficiary a right to terminate after a certain
age, if all income beneficiaries were dead and the optional
fifteen-year period had passed. In England a beneficiary under
no disability always has a power to terminate.33 In America
the rule of indestructibility was established in the Claflin case,
in which the trust was to terminate when the beneficiary reached
thirty-five. Although our indestructibility rule has been criti-
cized, 4 much can be said in its favor.
In spite of this possible objection, a majority of the Com-
mittee and the Reporter recommend that the American rule of
indestructibility be adhered to and that the present law remain
unchanged in this respect. Since this does not result in substitu-
tion, the settlor should have the power to determine the disposi-
tion of his property within the limits of the duration period.
The rule against perpetuities in Anglo-American law requires
only that interests "vest" within the period. Although there is
a companion rule requiring that a trust not be indestructible
for too long a time, our duration period is at least as conserva-
tive, if not more conservative, than the Anglo-American rule.
31. DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE G]iNERALt v° Substitutions, no 89 (1856) ; 3
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 3276-3298 (1959).
32. 11 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITIt T1l1fORETIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL- DES OBLIGATIONS no 3094 (1905).
33. 4 POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 567 (1949).
34. Martin, On the Terminability of Trusts, 13 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1939).
However, see 4 POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPER'TY § 3567 (1949) ; RESTATEMENT,
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 337 (1959).
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E. The Forced Heir's Right To Terminate as to His Legitime
The question of the right to terminate was considered sep-
rately as to the legitime in trust. Should the forced heir be able
to demand the principal of his reserved portion, at least after
a certain age? When the 1938 statute provided that the legitime
might be placed in trust, the duration period was shorter and
the forced heir would ordinarily receive his principal during his
lifetime. The lengthening of the duration has accomplished the
depriving of the forced heir of the enjoyment of his reserved
capital for his entire lifetime. The right of termination would
give him at least an option to continue the trust or demand the
reserved portion.
Again, a majority of the Committee and the Reporter recom-
mend that the present act remain unchanged in this respect. It
is often inconvenient for the trustee to be required to partition
the capital. The major objective of the trust may be to prevent
just this. The settlor can always provide that the trustee can
invade principal for the sole beneficiary of the trust, or a sep-
arable share, and the trustee is not limited to any standard of
support where there is one beneficiary of income and principal.
The settlor can, if he wishes, provide that the beneficiary have
the power of termination. The right of forced heirs may not
be abolished but it may be restricted.8 5 Therefore, there appears
to be no reason why the trust should not be indestructible even
where the legitime is placed in trust.
F. Spendthrift Provisions for Principal Affecting the Legitime
The original 1938 statute allowed spendthrift provisions for
income only. In 1944 this authorization was extended to include
spendthrift provisions for principal. Should the settlor be
allowed to prevent the forced heir's assigning his interest in the
principal of his reserved portion? It should be noted that the
1938 act authorized the placing of the legitime in trust so long
as all the income was paid to the forced heir, but ordinarily the
forced heir would actually receive the principal during his life-
time, and, moreover, the spendthrift provisions could not affect
the principal. By one of the 1952 amendments, the forced heir
35. Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 824, 57 So. 2d 695, 697 (1952) : "The
framers of the Constitution evidently contemplated that the creation of such trust
estates was not the abolishing of forced heirship. . . . Insofar as the codal articles
relating to forced heirship are concerned they must bow to this recent statute."
LA. R.S. 9:1794 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 74.
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may now have only a right to income and the power to dispose
of the principal at his death.86
The Committee members and the Reporter feel that the
present provisions should be retained. The settlor may choose
not to use the spendthrift provisions; but if the forced heir
needs their protection, the settlor has the means of providing
that protection. The trustee can be given discretion to advance
the capital in a proper case. This is an area in which no general
rule should be specified by the legislature. The settlor himself
should have the choice to use the provisions or not, as family
circumstances require.
G. Pour-Over Provisions
The Reporter and the Advisory Committee have recommended
that a provision authorizing "pour-over" dispositions be author-
ized. There are two methods of accomplishing a testamentary
pour-over of assets to a pre-existing inter vivos trust.
In the first, the testator bequeaths property to the trustee
on the same terms as set out in the inter vivos trust, referring
to that trust rather than repeating those terms in the will itself.
The purpose of this short-cut is not only to effect an economy
of effort in writing the will, but also to effect a merger of the
trusts for the purpose of administration by absolute identity of
terms of the two trusts. Obviously, the reference to a non-
testamentary document is met with the rule forbidding incor-
poration by reference. Some states having the general rule have
allowed an exception, where the act or fact referred to has
"independent legal significance." Thus, a typed list of disposi-
tions could not be incorporated, but a document that had legal
effect apart from the testament might be incorporated. Lou-
isiana has allowed reference to a pre-existing bill of sale in
order to determine the particular identity of the object of the
legacy.37 The Civil Code itself allows extrinsic evidence to clear
up an ambiguity in the designation of the legatee38 There was
no incorporation by reference in referring to a printed receipt
for deposit of a will in order to identify that will as the one
36. See Oppenheim, Louisiana's New Trust Law, 92 TRuSTS & ESTATES 362
(1952).
37. Hall v. Hill, McLean & Co., 6 La. Ann. 745 (1851).
38. LA. CIVur CODE art. 1714 (1870) ; see Succession of Tilton, 133 La. 435,
63 So. 99 (1913).
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being revoked.89 The weakest application of this exception is
said to be the "receptacle" cases where a testator leaves all that
shall be found in a certain drawer or trunk.40 Louisiana had
validated this type of disposition, even though the testament is
in fact amended by the mere act of adding to or withdrawing
money from the drawer or trunk.41 Furthermore, Louisiana has
allowed a disposition to be disposed according to typed instruc-
tions by finding the request precatory so that there was no need
for incorporation.
42
Thus, even if the language used clearly creates a new trust,
the exception could be applied to avoid the application of rule
against incorporation by reference.
The second theory for validating the result is by the use of
the true "pour-over." By this device no new testamentary trust
is created; there is merely an addition of assets by testament
to a pre-existing trust. This is a lega cy to a pre-existing trust.
No incorporation is necessary for the testament does not create
a new testamentary trust. The assets are added by will to an
inter vivos trust. The difficulty has been that testators may use
language that appears to create a new trust and the incorpora-
tion rule must be dealt with. For the purpose of curing any
doubt that such provisions shall be valid, nineteen states have
passed statutes authorizing some type of "pour-over" provision.
Forty-one states now consider some type of "pour-over" provi-
sions valid. Only in two states, including Louisiana, is the
"pour-over" reputed invalid.43
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have approved
a Uniform Testamentary Addition to Trusts Act, adopted in
August 1960. The statutes vary greatly in dealing with provi-
sions concerning power of revocation or amendment of the inter
vivos trust. If it is felt that a change of will should not be
accomplished by merely amending the inter vivos trust, this can
be met by authorizing the "pour-over" only to trusts in which
there is no power to amend or revoke the trust. However, amend-
39. Hessmer v. Edenborn, 196 La. 575, 199 So. 647 (1940) ; see Oppenheim,
The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1961).
40. See 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.2 (1956) ; Polasky, "Pour-over" Wills, 98 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 949, 951 (1959).
41. Roman Catholic Church v. Miller, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 101 (La. 1826).
42. Girven v. Miller, 219 La. 252, 52 So. 2d 843 (1951), 26 TUL. L. REv. 115,
117 ("The utility of the incorporation by reference doctrine suggests that the
Louisiana law of wills should be modified.").
43. See 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 832 (1960).
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ment of the trust is not nearly so informal as merely changing
the contents of a drawer, and that is allowed in Louisiana.
The Reporter and the Committee have recommended that
"pour-over" provisions be authorized in the trust code and pro-
visions permitting "pour-overs" have been drafted.
IV. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
A. General Considerations
In addition to those matters discussed thus far, the Reporter
and the Committee have considered the rights and remedies of
the beneficiary, the trust property, 44 problems of the community
property in trust and the substitution rule as it relates to class
gifts and survivorship conditions. In fact, most of the difficult
principal problems confronting the drafters of the new trust
code have been considered.
It was at this point that the Committee found itself in some-
what a dilemma. Just as, in the beginning, the major policy
hurdle of the conceptual formulation of the trust was referred
to the Committee, again a policy question was faced with ref-
erence to substitution and the "donee in being" rule. Most of the
Committee members feel that one of the objectives of the re-
vision of the Trust Estates Law should be to afford to Louisiana
settlors flexibility comparable to that afforded by other states.
All of the Committee members recognize that the jurisprudence
has interpreted Article 1520 so strictly as to ignore any other
provision of the Code that is not easily reconcilable with 1520.4 5
Even though the 1962 amendments seek to liberalize the rules
of the Louisiana jurisprudence: in regard to trusts, the question
arises whether to attempt to justify the new rules by clarifying
the meaning of the Civil Code and explaining in terms of legal
history. After a full study, we are convinced that the Civil Code
is not understood properly; but the proofs are not elegantly
simple. They involve all the complications of any discussion of
future interests. Most of the Committee members feel that per-
haps the best solution at this time is to authorize such provisions
44. While the Reporter and the Committee believe that a usufruct in trust is
valid, a specific provision is placed in the trust code to this effect. See Succession
of Harper, 147 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870) was amended in 1962 to achieve some
degree of liberality for "substitutions in trust." See Oppenheim, A New Trust
Code for Louisiana: Some Steps Toward Its Achievement, 37 TuL. L. REV. 169,
177-78 (1963).
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as seem needed in our present society. The constitutional amend-
ment certainly is in accord with this approach.
40
The policy arguments outlined in Marcad and repeated by
our writers and courts are the same arguments for any rules
against perpetuities. 47 This social policy finds its expression
in various formulae. The rule against "the remoteness of vest-
ing" is one definition, but leading American property scholars
have criticized the definition as inadequate. "It is fallacious
because it completely disregards the basic social policy for which
the rule against perpetuities has existed and for which it still
functions. That policy prohibits limitations causing socially in-
convenient interferences with the alienability and usefulness of
property. '48 Professor Powell alleged in the New York Report
on the Rule Against Perpetuities published in 1936 that the
rule against remote vesting exists so as to prevent "suspension
of the power of alienation," which were the terms of definition
of the New York rule. He asserted that both rules were really
the same rule. The third aspect of the rule is reflected in the
limited duration of indestructible trusts. For example, in a
non-spendthrift trust with power of sale, both the rule against
remoteness and the rule against suspension of alienation may
be satisfied. But nevertheless, such a trust may not last for too
long a time because ownership should not be dismembered for
too long a time. This was recognized by the New York Law
Revision Commission as another aspect of the rule.49 This aspect
is the best statement of the social policy of Louisiana. It is re-
flected in the statement in Succession of McCan5° that a testator
can dismember the property only by separating the usufruct for
one lifetime. This is not an accurate statement of the only dis-
memberment allowed by the Louisiana Civil Code, but it does
reflect the correct policy that ownership can be dismembered
for one lifetime. The Civil Code allows conditional legacy or
even conditional institution of heirship.5 1 These conditions will
necessarily be determined within one lifetime because the donee
46. The pertinent sentence of LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, reads:
"Substitutions not in trust are and remain prohibited; but trusts may contain
substitutions to the extent authorized by the Legislature."
47. See Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1961)
Comment, The Universality of a Curse: Future Interests in the French Law, 3
LA. L. REV. 795 (1941).
48. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 772(3) (1956 ed.).
49. N.Y. LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT 353 (1938).
50. 48 La. Ann. 145 (1896).
51. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1698 (1870).
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will lose his interest if he does not survive the condition. At
common law a contingent interest is transmissible but in civil
law it is not. Therefore, the civil law has this time limit on
conditions that is covered by the rule against perpetuities at
common law.
B. Trusts for a Class of Descendants
Since the trust dismembers the perfect ownership for one
lifetime, there is no policy reason against allowing the interests
in trust to be uncertain, as long as all vesting and ascertainment
takes place no later than the termination of the trust. If the
property is already "tied up" for one lifetime (the life that
measures the duration of the trust), the beneficial interest could
be given to those who are born within the period of the duration
of the trust, so long as one principal beneficiary of the class
was in being at the creation of the trust. A trust for afterborns
can be justified even though usufruct and naked ownership to
afterborns cannot. The trustee must represent all interests
impartially.
Just as in New York, we conclude that "remoteness of vest-
ing" is not allowed because it suspends alienation and dismem-
bers ownership. If dismembership is already allowed for a
limited time, then we need not require the interest to be vested
until the expiration of that time. Furthermore, it has been
pointed out that conditional legacy results in a gap of time
before vesting and the Civil Code limit on remoteness is that it
must vest within the lifetime of the conditional donee. There-
fore, there is no strict policy in our Code that every interest must
be vested immediately upon the death of the testator. Even if
our law does not allow conditional naked ownership, it should
be allowed in trust because a trustee will protect contingent
interests but a usufructuary might not.
At the same time most of the Committee members feel that
while the chief objective of our drafting is clarification of the
uses of the trust, a more flexible trust is highly desirable. It is
alleged that what settlors, trustees, and the lawyers most want
is a statute that details what can be done with the trust and one
which permits practical results to be achieved.
The result of the approach would seem to be this, based on
a study of the Civil Code and its antecedents. If the jurispru-
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dential interpretation of the Civil Code is relied upon, then it
is doubtful that any type of survivorship condition can be al-
lowed, and certainly not the class gift. If the Civil Code as
properly understood controls, then certain types of survivorship
conditions can be allowed, but not the class gift. If the trust
rules are not to be limited by a technical definition of substitu-
tion, but rather by the policy behind the substitution rule, then
survivorship conditions and the class gift can be allowed, so long
as property is not thereby "tied up" for more than one lifetime,
the measuring life of the trust.
The Reporter and the Committee feels that a limited type of
class gift which will be restricted to descendants should be per-
mitted. While difficult problems present themselves, it is felt
that the desirability of such a class gift makes it essential to
solve these problems in order to provide adequately for the needs
of Louisiana settlors.
C. The Marital or Conjugal Trust
The Reporter and the Committee are also presenting for
adoption a special type of trust that will affect the community
and separate interests of the husband and wife. In some in-
stances the settlor may desire to create a trust wherein the
income for all of his property, separate and community, will
go to the surviving spouse even though the corpus might go to
other parties. Only some of the results the settlor seeks to
achieve may be accomplished under the present Trust Estates
Law. For example, there may be children of a prior marriage
so that there is no usufruct of the surviving spouse to be placed
in trust or he has a considerable amount of separate property
and there are three or more children of the marriage.5 2 In other
community property states the widow's election has been used
by which the husband transfers the entire community interest
to a trust, creating a life estate for the wife with remainder over
to the children or other beneficiaries.5 3 However, the widow's
election does not seem possible in Louisiana. 54 The new provi-
sions contemplate a "conjugal trust" which may be created inter
52. It has been suggested that the settlor could place the usufruct of id. art.
1499 in trust, but this article has never been interpreted by the Louisiana courts.
53. See Comment, 37 TUL. L. REv. 297, 301 (1963) for a discussion of the
widow's election.
54. Ibid.
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vivos, may be revocable upon the death of the spouse first to die
and may consist of both community and separate property.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
In the preparation of the new code a reconsideration is being
made of the administrative provisions of the trust. This involves
duties and powers of the trustee, liabilities of the trustee, com-
pensation and indemnity of the trustee, allocation to interest
and principal, remedies of the beneficiary, etc. Since the Trust
Estates Law of 1938 contains the Uniform Income and Principal
Act,55 the new Income and Principal Act adopted in 1962 is
extremely helpful in redraftng this portion of the trust code.
As a matter of fact, all sources have been re-examined for
the entire project. Where new materials are available, these
have proved of inestimable assistance. The Restatement of
Trusts, Second, which has recently been completed, the redrafted
model Spendthrift Statute, the Uniform Testamentary Additions
to Trusts Act (1960), all have played a role in the redrafting.
Only by considering all facets of every problem, by carefully
examining and re-examining all questions, will a comprehensive
and understandable trust code emerge that will provide ade-
quately for Louisiana settlors.
55. LA. R.S. 9:2091-2101 (1950).
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